Want to Understand Trump’s Foreign Policy? Follow the Natural Resources.

At first glance, Venezuela, Greenland and Ukraine do not seem to have much in common. Yet, since the beginning of President Donald Trump’s second term, the three resource-rich territories have been under renewed American scrutiny. 

In the early hours of January 3, 2026, American military forces captured Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, after launching a large-scale strike on the country. Roughly five hours after Trump’s initial order, Maduro and Flores were on a plane heading towards the United States, soon to be facing charges of narco-terrorism, cocaine trafficking and unlawful possession of weapons in a New York courtroom. Known as Operation Absolute Resolve, the raid came after months of rising tensions between the Trump administration and the Maduro government over drug trafficking and oil. 

Oil has been a contentious topic between Venezuela and the United States for decades. The Orinoco Belt, which stretches along part of the namesake river, contains the world’s largest heavy crude oil reserves, estimated at 513 billion barrels. Oil companies, including foreign ones, have operated in Venezuela since the early 20th century, making oil an economic motor for the country despite the uneven redistribution of its revenue. The sector was largely nationalized under the new state oil company Petróleos de Venezuela S.A (PDVSA)​​ in the 1970s, leading foreign oil companies to sign agreements to continue their operations. However, in 2007, former president Hugo Chávez nationalized the remaining foreign-owned oil projects concentrated in the Orinoco Belt. Several major American companies, except for Chevron, left and have been engaged in legal battles for compensation ever since.

As the Chávez and later Maduro regimes grew increasingly authoritarian, the United States, traditionally Venezuela’s main client for oil, began imposing sanctions. The ensuing lack of investment and maintenance, as well as brain drain, severely hurt the country’s oil industry. In 1997, at its peak, Venezuelan oil production accounted for 5% of global production, or 3.5 million barrels a day. In 2025, it was around one million barrels a day. 

Despite the United States being the largest oil producer in the world, oil has historically been an important aspect of American foreign policy. It is one of several factors that contributed to the intervention in January, explains Paul Poast, Associate Professor of Political Science specializing in international security at the University of Chicago. “Venezuela is the one area where oil seemed to be very prominent in the decision-making being made.” At a press conference right after the intervention, Trump also justified the operation by accusing Venezuela of stealing oil from the United States, stating that “we built Venezuela’s oil industry with American talent, drive, and skill and the socialist regime stole it from us.”

While most of America’s oil is light sweet crude, used to make gasoline, 70% of American refining capacity has been designed to handle heavy crude, the type of oil found in Venezuela, which is crucial for diesel and jet fuel production. While some is imported from Canada, American refineries, especially those located in the Gulf Coast, could benefit financially from additional input. Yet, the United States already has enough diverse sources of oil, Ryan Kellogg, an Energy Policy and Environmental Economics professor at the University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy, points out. “Oil isn’t a reasonable motivation for taking this kind of action at all,” Kellogg explains. “Given how much we already produce and the diversity of supply that’s out there in the rest of the world, there’s no need to take control of Venezuelan oil for that.”

With Maduro gone, Trump announced that the United States would run Venezuela until a “safe, proper, and judicious transition” is achieved, adding that “it has to be judicious because that’s what we’re all about.” While Secretary of State Marco Rubio later downplayed the extent of future American involvement in Venezuela, the administration remains determined to have American oil companies invest an estimated 100 billion dollars to repair infrastructure and generate revenue for both countries. Yet, oil and gas executives voiced concerns at a White House meeting — ExxonMobil’s CEO Darren Woods called Venezuela “uninvestable,” an assessment that Kellogg agrees with. “They see all kinds of red flags when you look at a situation like this,” Kellogg said. Venezuela, especially with its history of nationalization, remains too politically unstable to attract long-term investment from oil companies. 

Under the Chávez and Maduro regimes, oil was more than just a resource. In response to U.S. sanctions, Venezuela strengthened its ties with American rivals such as China, Russia, and Cuba, which is why oil motivated this year’s operation in a “second-order” way, according to Poast. In 2017, Venezuela started pricing its oil in yuans as China bought most of it, receiving about half of its oil shipments. Meanwhile, Russia offset the effects of sanctions by providing the diluents necessary for heavy crude refining as well as technological support. Venezuelan oil revenues also served as an economic lifeline for Cuba, cementing their strong relationship. These ties to Cuba also contributed to the operation, according to Poast, who highlighted the influence of Rubio, a long-time proponent of regime change in Cuba, within the administration. 

Keeping China and Russia at bay in the Western Hemisphere was certainly part of the Trump administration’s strategy, as Trump has emphasized the relevance of the Monroe Doctrine (which his own foreign policy stance, the “Donroe Doctrine,” builds upon) and even referenced it when discussing the operation. The 1823 concept stipulates that no outside power can have influence within the Western Hemisphere and that the United States has a right to ensure it remains so. According to Poast, the Doctrine’s new prevalence in American foreign policy is part of a broader theory of Trump as a leader. “I view that the core to understanding Trump’s foreign policy is to say he is a 19th-century president. And the problem is, we’re in the 21st century.” It would also explain his frequent resort to tariffs, which were a key component of 19th-century American economic policies. 

While historically invoked regarding Latin America, Poast points to Greenland as another example of the Monroe Doctrine being at play. “Whereas I think that was a contributor to Venezuela, I think with Greenland it played a little bit more of a central role.” 

Less than a week into his second term, Trump revived a proposal he had made in 2019 to buy Greenland, a self-governing territory under Danish control. It became a topic Trump occasionally referenced until January 2026, when it took center stage as he refused to rule out taking Greenland by force. Trump argued that Denmark was supposedly unable to properly defend the territory in the midst of increased Chinese and Russian activity in the Arctic, making acquisition necessary for national security. After European countries expressed solidarity with Greenland, with some participating in a joint military exercise there, Trump targeted eight of them, including Denmark, with a 10% tariff rate, threatening to increase it if they remained unwilling to negotiate. On January 21, he finally walked back the tariff and stated that a deal was under negotiation with NATO members. While its details are still unknown, Poast thinks that both sides might settle for a 99-year-lease agreement, similar to the one between Britain and Hong Kong: “The reason why I keep bringing up a lease is that it allows Denmark to say that they’re still sovereign over it, but allows the US to say we have ownership of it.”

As climate change causes the melting of the Greenlandic ice sheet, the territory, located between North America and Europe, is gaining strategic importance for future trade routes and defense. Seeking to expand their influence in the Arctic, both China and Russia have increased their naval and military activity there, making Greenland an optimal place from which the United States can observe the actions of both countries. In this context, Trump has justified his demands by stating that “if we don’t take Greenland, Russia or China will.” However, NATO security guarantees cover Greenland, and the United States already has treaties with Denmark that would allow for increased American military presence there. Thus, for Poast, Trump’s emphasis on ownership demonstrates his desire for a return to 19th-century America, a country that was growing both territorially and economically. “He wants schoolchildren a hundred years from now to be reading in their history books: how did the U.S. get control of Greenland and why is it that the U.S. map shows Greenland? It’s because of President Donald Trump. That’s his legacy,” explains Poast.        

Trump has already confirmed that the deal with Greenland would include access to rare earth minerals, which are becoming more accessible as temperatures rise. Among Greenland’s largely untapped resources are 43 of the 50 minerals that the United States deems critical. Access to these minerals has become highly strategic due to their role in the green transition and technological sector. Yet, China dominates the mining and refining capacity for rare earths, making the United States heavily reliant on the Chinese government for access to these minerals. Therefore, developing a diverse supply chain is important, Kellogg emphasizes. Even with a deal, the mining of Greenland’s rare earth resources would face many challenges, such as its strict resource exploitation framework to ensure environmental protection, extreme climate and poor mapping of mineral deposits. 

Ensuring that the United States has preferential access to critical minerals has been a cornerstone of the Trump administration’s foreign policy. Poast notes that many agreements Trump has made with foreign countries have a critical mineral provision. Beyond the importance of these minerals for American industry, this emphasis is rooted in “a view of the world, which is very much a view Trump has, of zero sum, which is if we have a preferential agreement on these minerals, Russia won’t, China won’t.”

One such agreement is the minerals deal signed with Ukraine on April 30, 2025. First proposed by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in his 2024 Victory Plan, its goal was to protect critical resources from Russia while driving Western investment into the sector. Ukraine has deposits of more than 20 critical minerals per American standards, including what is believed to be one of the largest European reserves of titanium and lithium. Scheduled to be signed in February 2025, it became a source of tension after an Oval Office meeting in which Trump and Vice President JD Vance accused Zelenskyy of ingratitude for American military aid. Several Ukrainian lawmakers also criticized drafts of the agreement for being exploitative of the country’s natural resources. After further negotiations between the United States and Ukraine, the final version grants the United States preferential acquisition access to over fifty natural resources, including rare earths, natural gas and oil, but their ownership remains with Ukraine, who decides on their extraction. It also establishes a jointly managed reconstruction investment fund. Ukraine will place half of the profits it obtains from government-owned natural resources into it, while the United States will provide direct funds and military assistance. 

Both countries hailed the agreement as a clear sign of American commitment to Ukrainian sovereignty as Russia’s war on Ukraine rages on. Although the deal does not include any debt obligation, Trump has presented it as payback for American military aid. Behind the Trump administration’s foreign policy in Ukraine, Greenland, and Venezuela lies a common emphasis on transactionalism and on securing a strategic advantage against its rivals. “It’s about deals, it’s all about deals, and you have to have a situation where I’m getting something in return,” Poast explains. “In his view, I think the ultimate thing in return is oil, is minerals, is land.” 

Image from Peace Science Digest, licensed under Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0).